Résumé Livre Dimier the invention

This book explores the role of former colonial officials in designing the institution of the European Economic Community (EEC) responsible for implementing development aid programs in African countries (Directorate General 8 of the European Commission) as well as their long term influence over this institution (1957-2000). DG8 was in charge of the Association (1957) with the Overseas Countries and Territories, later on the Yaoundé (1963), Lomé conventions (1975), the Cotonou agreement (2000) with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. More specifically, it run the European Development Fund, the main instrument of EEC development aid.

My object of study is voluntarily Eurocentric as I focus on the birth and evolution over forty years of a specific European -multinational- institution, meaning by institution 'an organization infused with values' (Selznick), recognizable by its identity (goals, methods and policies), by the *esprit de corps* of its civil servants. Borrowing hypotheses from sociological, neo-institutionalist approaches and from the emerging research agenda on international organizations as bureaucratic entities, I analyze the pattern of creation, the evolving social structure and the organizational changes of DG8. I see how evolution in its personal and change in its environment affect its goals, methods and policies.

My approach is multidisciplinary: to a historical analysis based on archives (240 files) and a series of interviews with former (colonial) officials from DG8, I add a sociological approach including prosopography and concepts of political science. The book appeals to scholars working on European/multinational institutions for the questions it raises: how a multinational institution with officials coming from diverse backgrounds developed an esprit de corps. It also appeals to historians working on international/global development or post-colonial policies by its very object: the persistence of colonial methods in international development aid programmes.

The book is divided in two parts. It starts with an analysis of how former French colonial officials recycled their imperial experience and *esprit de corps* in DG8; the way they built DG8's authority, legitimacy and identity as an aid donor in interaction with their main constituency, the African political elite and in an environment marked by decolonization. As a leader in the institutionalization process, Jacques Ferrandi, a former French colonial official and director of the European Development Fund, placed its own colonial team at key positions in DG8 and infused this new born institutions with his colonial values, methods and goals, what became to be dubbed 'Ferrandi's style'. Development goals were copied on those advocated at the colonial school in the 1930s-40s with the ideas of 'respect for native cultures' , 'evolution within tradition'. DG8's policies and projects in rural development and infrastructure were those implemented by France in its colonial African territories. Ferrandi's methods of aid management, like French colonial administration's, were based on very personal relationships with the African heads of states, the creation of legal precedents, arbitrary and opaque decisions as far as the distribution of funds among the recipients and the criteria used to appraise projects proposals were concerned. I argue that Ferrandi and his team of colonial officials created in the heart of Brussels a type of institution well adapted to dealing with emergent African administrations. DG8's identity and legitimacy were indeed modelled on the neo-patrimonial system of its African clients: a system in which the authority and legitimacy of those in power were based on mutual trust and obligations, personal and affective

ties, permanent exceptions to the laws and compromise, the core of what was termed Indirect Rule during colonial times.

The second part of the book examines how DG8's identity and legitimacy evolved over time following successive EEC enlargements and significant changes in DG8's social structure, constituency and environment. I will analyze the extent to which this evolution constituted a very slow and incremental process towards the 'bureaucratic logic' (in the Weberian sense of the word), meaning the rationalization of procedures in distributing aid. With Britain joining the EEC and its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific, about to join the Lomé convention, battle of interests between member states, especially, France and Britain, intensified in the 1970s, each trying to defend the interests its own former colonial territories and businesses. These battles fueled internal battles within DG8 between Ferrandi's 'clan' and young economists supported by some civil servants of the British Overseas Administration, who advocated rational instruments like programming and evaluation. Eventually set up as part of the Lomé convention, these instruments aim to help defining and enforcing impersonal, objective and standardized rules in distributing aid (among ACP countries), to eliminate arbitrary criteria and personal influence in the appraisal of project proposals.

Mobilizing 'path dependency' theories, I argue here that despite this apparent bureaucratization and the departure of Ferrandi, the colonial path taken by DG8 during the first years of its existence was difficult to change. Cheysson, the new French Commissioner of development, while making compromise with English demands and interests, resorted to the same client-patron relationships with African post-colonial elites as Ferrandi, merely extending the system to British former colonies. These new instruments only began to gain ground in the 1990s, as bureaucratic values like efficiency slowly developed within DG8 and came to constitute more and more the basis of its legitimacy. The departure of the old colonial guard, the reform of the European Commission along the lines of the New Public Management ethos in the 2000s and the growing power of the World Bank and the OECD in producing norms (like conditionality, efficiency of aid) further reinforced this evolution.

Chapter 1. 'Grandeurs et Servitudes Européennes en Afrique' (European Greatness and Servitude in Africa) p. 10-21.

In this chapter I analyze the context in which the Association with overseas countries and territories was negotiated, in which DG8 was created and its main, instrument the European Development Fund, was set up. The 'Association' with Overseas Countries and Territories was born of a convergence of opportunities: decolonization on the one hand and the building of the EEC on the other. In 1957, while discussing the Treaty of Rome, the member states of the EEC tried to find an agreement as to how the territories which were still under colonial rule (mainly French and Belgian overseas territories in sub-Saharan Africa) could be associated to the EEC. For France, and in particular, Gaston Defferre, the French Minister for Overseas territories, it 'was unthinkable that France 'should sacrifice its African vocation for a European one', an argument that was difficult to accept for some member states like Germany or the Netherlands, which did not have any specific interests in Africa. I insist on the absence of the African elite in those discussions at a time when France, the main initiator of these discussions, was granting its overseas territories a growing autonomy through the Defferre's laws. This explains the apprehension of those elites vis-à-vis an Association that some considered as a 'new pacte colonial'. It also explains their reluctance to sign the successor of the association, the Yaoundé convention with the EEC, when the African territories became independent in the early 1960s.

As Senghor, who, from 1952 on, took part in the works of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, had already warned: 'we may agree in this marriage of convenience to be the servants who carried the veil of the bride, but we do not want to be the wedding gift'. Since France saw in the Association a means to continue its development mission in Africa while sharing this burden with other EEC member states, the trade and aid mechanisms that came about were, indeed, copied on French colonial ones: they replicated the preferential imperial trade system and the Fonds d'Investissement Economique et Social set up in 1946 to financed public investments in the French colonies. More precisely, the European development fund mechanism were created to work in the context of colonial administration. The first Commissioner for development, Henri Lemaignen, was an important figure of the French patronat in colonial Africa and he quickly asked J. Ferrandi, to be his head of Cabinet.

Chapter 2. Brussels or the Last French Colony: French Colonial Officials' Leadership in Designing DG8, pp. 22-42.

Ferrandi, along with other French ex-colonial officials, played a crucial role in building the identity of DG8. As a 'leader' in the institutionalization of DG8, he had the difficult task of interpreting and articulating the organization's purposes (development aid) to its own people (DG8 civil servants) and to constituencies in its environment (here the elites of the associates countries and territories). He had to define DG8's mission, norms and methods and orient DG8's social and power structure in such a way as to provide the institution with a strong social base capable of sustaining its mission and his own authority, both internally and externally. As Head of Cabinet of Lemaignen, he placed his own men (French colonial officials like him) in key positions in DG8 and assisted in a reorganization of the DG8 that would propel him into the positions of Director of the EDF (1963) and Deputy Director General (1970-75). Thanks to this position and helped by his team, he socialized other civil servants of DG8 to his colonial methods of aid management and to his own interpretation of development aid.

Following Liesbet Hooghe's hypothesis about the socialization of Commission officials, I assume that his former socialization at the French colonial school and his prior experience (in the Directorate General of the Economic Services of the West African Federation) had an influence in the way he shaped DG8's mission of development. The EEC mission of development was indeed interpreted by Ferrandi in a very specific way that departed from the prevalent discourse of the world Bank based on modernization theories, i. e. universal and standardized models of development. The idea was to guide them, in a very paternalistic way, towards modernity while respecting their cultures. For example, he kept warning that 'the experts would be too technocratic. The weak point of our current experts is neither their skills, nor their technologies, but their excess of skills and technologies, their inability to adapt these technologies to the country in which they are applied'. This rhetoric ('progress in their own way') was typical of the French colonial discourse of the 1930-1950s as embodied in the idea of 'evolution with respect for tradition'. Like Robert Delavignette, the head of the colonial school in the 1930s, he kept criticizing those who loved 'juggling with statistics' and were easily guided by the 'fanatical intolerance of progress', thereby justifying his own opaque system of aid distribution based on personal relationship and political priorities rather than on clear, measurable criteria linked to the potential economic and social benefit of the projects.

Ferrandi's idea of adaptation to African culture and context was not pure rhetoric indeed. I argue in this chapter that, thanks to his networks among the African elite, he devised a client-

based system of aid distribution which was really well adapted to the neo-patrimonial system of many African post-colonial states. I assume that colonial governments, through their practices and principles (most notably through indirect rule), contributed significantly to the main features of neo-patrimonial systems. These features were hybrid in nature: seen from the outside, the neo-patrimonial states resembled any bureaucracy, as defined by Max Weber. Weber posits a rational–legal type of administration where authority and legitimacy are based on the right of the state to define and enforce legal, impersonal, standardized rules through command and control, through a hierarchical structure and a professional, full-time administrative staff whose salaries, pensions, recruitment and promotion patterns ideally rest on competence/merit/seniority rather than personal influence. In the case of the neo-patrimonial states, this imposed and imported bureaucracy constituted no more than the external facade of a much more complex political system usually described as neo-patrimonial. Indeed, from the inside, power and positions were garnered by strong leaders and their 'clans' whose patrimonial style of authority and legitimacy rested on a web of very personal relationships, bonds of trust, loyalty, mutual respect and obligation. Opacity of administration, a regime that operated outside the structures of rules and the absence of clear objectives from an aid point of view were permanent features of the neo-patrimonial system. Above all, this system rested on the capacity of political leaders to 'nurture' clients through the distribution of sinecures and money extracted from external aid and other sources. In this chapter I see how Ferrandi and his team of ex-colonial officials were able to model DG8 and the management of the EDF on the neo-patrimonial model of their clients.

Chapter 3 'Du Bon Usage de la Tournée': DG8's Quest for Legitimacy p. 43-58.

This adaptation was important in securing the support of the African post-colonial elites. As a leader in the institutionalization process, Ferrandi had to build the legitimacy of DG8, i. e. to make its mission acceptable. Restoring confidence with African elites became increasingly urgent once decolonization became a reality. Certainly, the Association could not proceed without the consent of the newly independent countries, and in the context of the Cold War, many African states may have been tempted to look for support in the Soviet camp. Neither could the Association continue without the support of member states such as Germany or the Netherlands, which had once considered it as a transitional arrangement. Following Thomas Diez's reflection on the way the identity and legitimacy of the EEC as an external actor was constructed, the chapter will analyse the strategy and instruments used to achieve this aim. Certainly, transforming what was seen as the 'mere survival of a historical situation' into a 'grande oeuvre de solidarité' [great charitable solidarity effort] proved to be a difficult political task–no less dramatic a trick than pulling a rabbit from a hat, perhaps. The aim was to recast DG8's mission as something totally new and unique in the world, quite different from the colonial past. Ironically, the sleight of hand used several colonial artefacts. Among the main 'magicians' was Ferrandi's team of ex-French colonial officials.

I will posit that their success largely depended on their capacity to adapt DG8's strategies to the diverse public to which these strategies were addressed (i.e. the expectations and political culture of a certain elite, whether European or African). On the one hand, public relations and information campaigns were organized in order to persuade the European elites (including the British, which at once were very critical of the Association) that this Association, and later the Yaoundé convention with the 18 Associated Malagasy and African states, was consistent with the United Nation principles and the benevolent norms embodied in the European project. On the other hand, methods based on organized dramatization of power and ritualized touring, similar to those the French Republic used to impose its colonial rule, were applied, in order to

convince the emerging African leaders that the Association was a 'collaboration between equal and sovereign partners' radically different from the paternalistic relations of the colonial past.

I also show that DG8's 'propaganda' was part of the general campaign to sell Europe to European citizens and the world – as organized by a French official, Jacques René Rabier, head of the Press and Information Office of the European Commission. In order to assert the Commission's worldwide ambition, a specific service dealing with overseas territories had been created. It was soon decentralized and attached to DG8, which allowed the latter to devise its own strategy. The official responsible for this specific service from 1958 to 1986 was Pierre Cros, one of the 'functionary–militants' recruited by Rabier and a former head of the French High Commissioner Press Office in Dakar (1955–1958). Within DG8, he shared his tasks with the head of the Directorate A ('General Affairs') responsible for dealing with external public relations, Jaap Van Der Lee, who came from the EEC country that was the main opponent to the Association – the Netherlands. Trained in Amsterdam, Paris (Sorbonne) and Cambridge University (UK), Van der Lee was fluent in several languages, a rare competency in a DG dominated by French. As such, he had important connections in the UK, the Netherlands and other European countries. These connections, like those of Cros in Africa, constituted a precious asset in that propaganda campaign that aimed, as expressed by Ferrandi, to demonstrate that the Association was 'one of the most favourable elements, though the least expected, that contributes to the reinforcement of the European spirit. Indeed we cannot find material interests that are powerful enough to disturb the blossoming of a real European policy of solidarity. Africa must help to build Europe'.

Last but not least I argue that these direct links and the 'growing autonomy of DG8' in its propaganda campaign came to irritate Paris. On the one hand, the French government could only praise the determination of the Commission 'to refute any accusation of neo- colonialism'. On the other hand, the same French authorities never ceased to complain about 'a certain tendency by the European Commission, already perceptible from sometimes now, to establish and intensify contacts with the authorities and the local population of the overseas territories' without French mediation. Hence, before independence, the French government tried to exercise a '*haute surveillance*' on DG8. Once decolonization was impending, once African leaders such as Houphouët-Boigny and Sylvanus Olympio informed Paris that they wanted to have 'direct links with the Commission', i.e. 'to have their own representation in Brussels in order to assert their independence', Paris tried, in vain, to prevent this evolution. There is no doubt that Michel Debré, the French Prime Minister, and Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, feared that Brussels would 'compete' with Paris or even worse, would be used as a 'resort' against Paris by the newly independent states in their attempt to assert their autonomy.

Chapter 4. Flag Dictatorship within the European Commission? The Construction of DG8's Autonomy , p. 59-79.

I will see in this chapter, how Ferrandi, indeed, was instrumental in increasing DG8's autonomy from its main stakeholder, France. I dispute the idea that Ferrandi, as French, served French interests and, as argued by inter-governmentalist scholars, that supranational institutions, such as Directorates General of the European Commission, usually remained the mere instruments ('agents') of the states that created them ('the principals'), that is, to use a pithy phrase, DGs with flags. Certainly, in his dealings with the elite of former French colonies,

whose legitimacy and authority still depended mostly on French military, financial and political support, Ferrandi could not ignore French interests and priorities in Africa. However, as a leader in DG8's institutionalization process, he could also adopt a more supranational strategy likely to disturb these interests. His capacity to keep some distance from the French government is exemplified by the two issues he had to deal with in the early 1960s: the issue of technical assistance, the purpose of which was to help the newly independent states devise their project proposals; and the issue of the financial and technical control of the EDF projects. These issues illustrate the extent to which, under which conditions and through which processes, senior officials may shift their allegiance from their home institution to a supranational body and so behave like autonomous actors capable of promoting the European project and the interests of the Commission.

Concerning DG8, the conditions were set by France, which regarded the EDF as a piggy-bank set to serve the interests of its companies in Africa. This resulted in important battles among Member States over the distribution of the EDF cake. Drawing on Pierson's neo-institutionalist hypotheses, I show how Ferrandi used Member States' conflicts to play the role of arbiter, thereby reinforcing his own authority and obtaining a further delegation of competence (in this case concerning technical assistance and financial control of the EDF). He eventually succeeded, against or rather behind the back of France, to set up in own *contrôleurs techniques* of the EDF (since then transformed into EU delegations). Hence, DG8 eventually took on a life of its own, following a different path from the one originally planned for it by some of the Member States. This paths however, remained based on Ferrandi clientelistic system with francophone elites in Africa, something that the first enlargement was likely to disturb.

Chapter 5. Fashoda Revisited: The Effects of the First EEC Enlargement on DG8. pp. 80-99.

Indeed, when, after two abortive attempts, Britain eventually succeeded in joining the EEC in 1973, provisions for the Commonwealth 'associables' (ex British colonial territories in the Caribbean, Pacific and African countries) had to be agreed upon and inserted in the UK, Ireland and Denmark Accession Treaty, signed in Brussels in January 1972 (Protocol 22). Under the provisions of Protocol 22, the 'associables' were offered three options: participation in Yaoundé II's successor, association under Art. 238 of the Treaty of Rome, as already experienced by some of them, or straightforward trade agreements. In the end they all opted for the first solution: signed in February 1975, the new Lomé Convention included 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (the ACP).

I show here that paradoxically, the Lomé Convention, which was portrayed as the end of the old colonial divide between Anglophone and Francophone African countries, was the result of a major confrontation between the two oldest colonial enemies. Within the EEC, the UK accession was likely to fuel the old debate between the 'regionalists' such as France, which persistently opposed any attempt to enlarge the geographical scope of the Yaoundé Convention, and the 'globalists' such as Germany and the Netherlands, which encouraged the extension of the existing cooperation agreements to all underdeveloped countries. Methods that had previously been accepted and considered efficient were labelled 'nepotism' by the British newcomers. The latter demanded clearer goals for EEC development: the fight against poverty as advocated by the World Bank at that time. They asked more rational, impartial and transparent methods in the management of the EDF, that is, clear criteria such as 'needs' in distributing the funds among the ACP states or the potential economic and social impact of the projects in selecting them. They supported the introduction of new instruments such as

programming and evaluation. I argue that those new instruments were a way to ensure that the EDF cake would be divided equally among former British and French colonies. As such, British demands results in battles with France and her African clients.

As a leader, Ferrandi failed to adapt to this new environment. He did not succeed in playing the role of arbiter between French and British interests and in mediating between DG8, its social structure and its enlarged constituency. Indeed, his personal system was too linked to the Franco– African elite and his knowledge of the Anglophone elites and territories was too limited. His own coalition of colonial officials within DG8 had to cope with the growing ambitions of a group of young economists, who took advantage of this favourable context and of the newly arrived British officials in the DG to defend and impose their vision and methods of aid management. Those were similar to the ones advocated by the UK Overseas Development Administration and represented a clear threat to Ferrandi's power.

In sum, enlargement triggered a battle between coalitions where Member States' interests (especially those of France and Britain) were identified with 'clans' within DG8: on one side, the dominant colonial clan, supported by France, defended the existing methods. On the other side, a peripheral clan led by young economists defended by Britain was fighting for more rational and transparent methods of running the EDF (clear criteria, such as 'needs', in distributing the funds and new instruments, such as programming, meant to limit the arbitrary decisions of DG8 officials). As conflicts within DG8 amplified, a regulation of power between the two coalitions proved necessary and a renegotiation of some elements became inevitable to allow some place for British interests and ideas. It fell to the new French Commissioner for Development, Claude Cheysson, taking up his appointment in 1973, to play the role of arbiter and, through administrative reorganizations of DG8, to precipitate Ferrandi's departure in 1975.

Chapter 6. EEC development policy. A sedimentation of Empires?

In this chapter, I demonstrate, that despite a shift of power among the two coalitions that existed within DG8 and the attempts at reforms by Cheysson, many of DG8's neo-patrimonial methods and practices were replicated and merely extended to the new anglophone associated states (the African Caribbean and Pacific countries). Despite re-organizing DG8 and setting up new instruments like programming and evaluation, Cheysson eventually perpetuated the same client-based system and methods as Ferrandi's. As soon as 1973, he embarked on several grand tours in Africa in order to convince reluctant anglophone leaders like NKrumah, to joint the future Lomé convention, and the francophone leaders to accept this possibility. Accompanied by Maurice Foley, a former British Labour MP and Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office who entered DG8, British journalists and ex-British colonial officials well connected to African networks, he used the same tools as Ferrandi's. Thanks to these tactics and his capacity to play the role of arbiter between the several interests at stake, he successfully replaced Ferrandi in his leadership function, that of mediating between DG8 and its environment. As a result of the same process, however, he inexorably followed the path taken by Ferrandi. Despite Cheysson's claim of novelty, DG8's mission remained roughly unchanged, with only a few adjustments necessitated by the evolving international environment. The same cultural relativism and the same discourse on the necessity of 'adaptation' to African cultures and context, which concretely here means compromising with dictatorships, was used. More than ever before, DG8's interests remained linked to those of its African clients, a kind of symbiosis that may explain why the possibility of sanctions against governments committing serious human rights abuses was never raised as a serious issue, despite numerous demands in that

direction by the European Parliament and burgeoning NGOs who fought for the respect of human rights.

Following neo-institutionalist theories of path dependency, I argue that the colonial path taken by DG8 and the networks built with the African elite, on which DG8's legitimacy and authority were based, rendered any grand reform impossible, in the short term at least. The fact that, despite Ferrandi's departure, most of ex-colonial officials remained at key positions within DG8 till the mid 1980s and that British commission officials like Foley either sided with them or were sidelined, help understand this continuity. Speaking in terms of 'institutional layering' I emphasize the extraordinary capacity of DG8 to adapt to its new environment, accommodate new interests and powerful actors (Britain and its African clients) while keeping intact the core elements of its identity and legitimacy.

Chapter 7: Roads and rural path dependencies.

In order to strengthen my hypothesis concerning the persistence of DG8's identity over the years, I will focus my attention on two practical examples, which also correspond to the two main fields of DG8's activities (rural development and transportation). I will demonstrate how, in both fields, policies and discourses derived from past colonial experience have been repeated from the early 1960s onwards, leading to the same outcomes. The fact that most DG8 officials continued to advocate the same kind of public action, despite what these evaluations considered as repeated failures, constitutes the most significant sign of the path dependency phenomenon. As I show in the case of transportation policy, it also exemplifies the continuity of their dependence, or rather the dependence of DG8's identity and legitimacy, on the needs and interests of their main partners, the ruling African elite.

I begin this chapter by focusing on the rural development programme advocated by Edgar Pisani, commissioner for development in the 1980s. The objective of this programme, presented as totally 'new', was to convince Africa that its destiny lay with the expansion of peasant work, that development could only be sustainable if it answered local needs and was adapted to local realities, both cultural and environmental. As part of this programme, farmers' cooperatives, small factories and micro-credit had to be developed with the help of NGOs. An education system had to be set up, which could teach young farmers how to conserve the soil, using new techniques. These techniques would take into account traditional know how and its mode of transmission while improving the productivity and standard of living of the rural population. These instruments, it was hoped, would increase food production and stop people leaving the land.

One could not find a better expression of the old colonial idea of 'evolution with respect for traditions'. Such continuity is hardly surprising: Pisani's main advisers were none other than DG8 colonial officials whose inspiration was Delavignette's 'black peasants' policy. Born in the 1930s, this policy was the direct answer to the failure and damaging effects of ambitious irrigation schemes launched by public organizations such as the Service des Travaux d'Irrigation du Niger. Its objectives were to help small African farmers increase their production in such a way as to ensure their food security, a surplus to be exported and the preservation of their traditions, 'roots' and values. Concretely, it means keeping farmers on their lands, providing them with small techniques adapted to their 'spirit', training them and

organizing a system of cooperatives based on solidarity and voluntary contribution. Like Pisani's policy, it was based on an idealized conception of African societies: these societies were seen as mainly rural, made up of small villages where 'black peasants' lived in harmony with one another and with nature, bound together by religious solidarity, collective working and a same 'communion with the land'. Backed by Marius Moutet, the Colonial Minister in the late 1930s, such policy, what Moutet called '*un grand programme de petits travaux*' (a large programme of small works), was tested after the Second World War, at a time when forced labour was abolished and more incentive based means were used to convince small farmers to increase their production .

In practice, however, such policy failed in the 1930s as in the 1950s: the involvement of farmers in cooperatives bore a large resemblance to military conscription and consequently met with the same resistance. Supervised as they were by colonial officials or their successors, the agricultural 'advisers', cooperatives and '*paysannats*' became a mere means for the colonial or post-colonial states to extend their bureaucratic control over rural societies. An evaluation ordered by the Commission at the end of the 1970s insisted on the fact that the local relay of the Commission (whether European advisers or local staff hired on contract by the ACP States) often used classical methods of control and surveillance rather than playing the role of simple advisers and trainees. The report also highlighted what it considered as the inability of DG8 services to tackle the complex social, economic, political and administrative reality of Africa, in sum their a-political vision of the problem of hunger in Africa. The lack of food was due less to a shortage of local production and insufficient productivity, as Pisani assumed, than to the devastating effects on local producers of imported products (including EEC food aid) and to the fundamental political problem of the redistribution of resources. This was clear in Ethiopia, where famine was also exacerbated by the forced resettlement of the rural population and the policy of 'collective villagization' implemented by the state to control the rebellion.

The same repeated failures and waste of money were highlighted in the case of transportation by a series of evaluation and reports from the Commission itself, the European court of auditors and British experts like Adrian Hewitt (from the Overseas Development Institute). Many of the roads and railways constructed by the EDF had the same purposes as those constructed during colonial times, such as facilitating access to unexploited mineral resources. Most of them, like the trans-cameroon railway, were originally started by colonial powers at the beginning of the 20th century. Relaunched in the 1970s thanks to a joint project funded by USAID, French bilateral aid and the EDF, the trans-cameroon railway meant to unite the country, ease the transport of precious timber and allow the exploitation of new minerals. Comparing these aims with the outcome of the project, Hewitt concluded that its development impact was nil. The fact that DG8 was unable to change the course of events despite its programming framework and the huge amount of money invested meant that it shared responsibility with the Cameroon state for the choices around prioritization and implementation of such projects, whose nature was in fact largely political according to Hewitt: the aim was to consolidate the reputation and power of President Ahidjo, backed by France. Indeed, the construction of expansive and prestigious works, whatever their outcome, was not without political or other benefits. These benefits could be shared among all the actors concerned with the EDF projects: for DG8, infrastructure construction was a good way to be visible and to increase its legitimacy and authority in the field of development; for the European firms and experts, it allowed them to secure contracts sometimes through dubious practices; for the African Heads of State, whose authority and legitimacy rested on the display of wealth and the capacity to distribute sinecures to potential clients, it generated

prestige, personal funds and clients; for Member States, such as France, it enabled them to keep their allies and influence in Africa. The resulting symbiosis or mutual dependency between DG8 and its African clients was well summarized by Hewitt: if such is the stuff of cooperation, he concluded, it ought to signal to the ACP governments that the EEC needs the ACP quite as much as they need the community. However, as Hewitt report exemplified, demands for more evaluation, the search for efficiency began to disturb this 'discreet entente'.

Chapter 8. In the Name of Efficiency.

In this chapter, I explore the way efficiency, the watchword that did so much to inform the evaluation process, appeared and evolved within DG8 in the 1980s-1990s, how it came to have such a central role within organizations that was at once radically opposed to it. Indeed, what was still a debatable concept in the 1960s–1970s, 30 years later has become a 'diktat' and a 'passion' that pervades all the official reports of DG8, as well as those of other donors. Like institutionalists, anthropologists and sociologists of bureaucracy, I consider this new 'passion' for efficiency as the introduction within DG8 of bureaucratic 'myths' or 'ideals' (like transparency and objectivity) and the setting up of new instruments such as evaluation and 'value for money audit' as the advent of bureaucratic ceremonial and ritual practices.

I also show how Member States (most notably the UK and its Overseas development Administration) and other EEC institutions (the Court of auditors) used 'efficiency' strategically in their tussles with the European Commission; how a small number of officials found in them an opportunity to strengthen their position within DG8 against the old guard constituted by ex-colonial officials.

As will be all too clear in this chapter, these 'pioneers' of efficiency met with stiff resistance among DG8 staff and their clients, which may explain why it took more than 20 years for efficiency to gain ground in EEC development discourse and for the evaluation unit, created in 1975, to gain power. Following neo-institutionalist theories, I posit that the cumulative effects of small-scale changes introduced by some actors at the margins had in the long run important consequences for the overall evolution of the institution. From an institution modelled on the neo-patrimonial habits of its clients, DG8 began a move towards bureaucratization (as defined by Max Weber), albeit a very slow and incremental one.

Chapter 9: From indirect to direct rule…: towards 'normative power of Europe'?

Bureaucratization, i.e. the slow rationalization of EDF management procedures, is be object of this chapter. In the 1990s, it took the form of new instruments, such as complex mechanisms of evaluation, and the establishment of an increasing number of 'objective' criteria in the allocation of funds to the ACP states (including political norms like respect for human rights, democracy, good governance).

Indeed, the European development policy, as set out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, included the general objectives for consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and for respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. These objectives became core elements of the EU pledge to fight poverty. The same principles also constituted essential elements of the partnership in Lomé IV bis (1995), which included provisions for full or partial suspension of aid in case of non-respect for principles

of democracy and human rights (Art. 366a). Furthermore, political conditions were consecrated by the Cotonou Agreement (2000), a convention signed for 20 years and that concerned 77 ACP countries. This agreement included further measures for sanctions (Art. 96) and political dialogue, distinguishing between essential elements (human rights, democracy and rule of law) for which sanctions apply and fundamental elements (good governance and the fight against corruption), which are open to compromise.

For many analysts, this evolution was the result of drastic changes in the international environment: the end of the Cold War and the reformulation of the North/South relations following the debt crisis of the 1980s granted donors a greater degree of leverage in dictating conditions. Through their Structural Adjustment Programmes, powerful institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank began to condition their aid (budget support) to 'sound economic reform programmes', that is, liberal measures and austerity plans that questioned the role of the state in development policy and eroded the capacity of the African ruling elites to maintain their networks of clients through the monopolization and distribution of the national resources. By the end of the 1980s, their growing preoccupation with 'good governance' and democracy, shared by important donors such as France and Britain, also put African political regimes under increasing pressure to liberalize their political spheres (Harrison, 2004). This context, in particular the capacity of the World Bank/IMF to impose international norms in the development field and present their policy as the most 'efficient', undoubtedly forced some changes upon DG8. Like most organizations, DG8 embraced norms that were widely shared in its environment and tried to model itself after organizations it perceived as successful, in order to maintain its legitimacy.

However, this chapter argues that these changes, whether or not they were precipitated by the international context, were typical of DG8's evolution towards bureaucratization. Indeed, as objective criteria for distributing funds among the ACP States, political conditions (like needs in the 1970s) were part of the bureaucratic tools meant to ensure impartiality, neutrality and balance between the various competing coalitions, following the second and third enlargements of the European Union. As such, political conditions represented a further step towards a rationalization of procedures and the 'pursuit of objectivity. As a concept, political conditionality undoubtedly marked the passage from 'indirect rule' – a system in which legitimacy was based on personal bonds of trust and political compromises, and in which decisions concerning the distribution of funds were kept secret – to 'direct rule' – a system in which legitimacy was based on new bureaucratic ideals such as transparency, neutrality and efficiency, in which aid distribution depended on the imposition of clear norms, criteria and the possibility of sanctions. As a bureaucratic instrument, conditionality was part of these 'technologies of government' aimed to regulate from a distance and to replace personal trust, as a means of control, with trust in 'numbers'. In a context of growing distrust and disappointment in external aid, DG8 came to rely increasingly on measurement tools devised to evaluate the 'performance' of the recipient countries in achieving precise objectives and their capacity to respect their engagements.

Within DG8, the idea of political conditionality (with its sanction mechanisms) was likely to meet much resistance as it called into question DG8's opaque bonds of trust with the African elite, i.e. its legitimacy and identity. Following a new wave of EEC enlargements and the formation of new coalitions, it became (along with the position to adopt towards the World Bank policies) the most divisive issue.

Chapter 10: 'Adieu les artistes, here come the managers'.

In this chapter, I see how bureaucratization opened DG8 ground to new expertise and specialists: the 'auditors' and 'managers'. Following the retirement of the last ex-colonial officials, pioneers and leaders holding key positions within the institution were replaced by managers whose main preoccupation was less the purpose and mission of the institution than its 'efficiency' in reaching certain goals. Their power increased in a context where the administrative paradigm of New Public Management became the basis for the overall reform of the European Commission and external aid programmes. Among these managers was Philip Lowe, the first British official to hold the position of Director General of DG8, and who became later the head of Cabinet of Neil Kinnock, the Vice-President of the Commission responsible for administrative reform (from 1999 to 2004). In 1997, he tried to make DG8 the seedbed for the Commission's overall reform along the lines of New Public Management.

As part of these reforms, one of the main functions of DG8 (i.e. the management of the EDF) was transferred to a new Commission service, EuropeAid, whose 'professionals' were supposed to replace the 'colonial artists' of DG8 (renamed DG DV) and whose legitimacy was entirely linked to the bureaucratic value of 'efficiency'. DG DEV was left with the vague task of programming and operating political dialogue with ACP countries. Its role was further questioned in 2010 by the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) following the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The aim of this service is to support the EU High Representative, who is also the Vice-President of the Commission and the President of the Foreign Affairs Council, in fulfilling his or her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union and to ensure the consistency of the Union's external action, including development cooperation. Comprised of officials from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission (the former DG External Relations), as well as personnel from the diplomatic services of the Member States, it is responsible for the EU delegations (formerly Commission delegations), political dialogue (respect for human rights and other related objectives) and programming for the EDF and other aid programmes. As such, it has to determine (in collaboration with the Commissioner for Development) the global financial envelope for country allocations.

Whether, in practice, this evolution led to radical changes as far as the methods used to implement development projects are concerned, remains open to question. Certainly, it led to new battles of competences between the several services involved. As fact-finding activities, evaluation reports and statistics became ends in themselves, it also resulted in a certain 'routinization' of the institution. Evaluation, for example, seems to have become a 'rationalized ritual of inspection', which produces 'comfort and hence organizational legitimacy, by attending to formal control structures and auditable performance measures. However, behind this routinization and ritualized behaviour, it may well be that old practices based on personal relationships and discretion in aid distribution have persisted as they are the only way for the EU to keep a certain legitimacy in the eyes of its aid beneficiaries – the African elite. Incoherence in the way political conditionality has been implemented by DG8 is a proof of that.

Chapter 11. EEC bureaucracy in action.

The bureaucratization of the delegations of the European Commission in ACP States (renamed EU delegations) and the professionalization of their staff is be the object of the last chapter. I see how, from the 1970s onwards, the delegates pursued aims to be considered as real diplomats, to become civil servants and to benefit from more transparent recruitment and rotation procedures.

The '*contrôleurs-techniques*' were the backbone of Ferrandi's system based on ties of personal dependence. They were successively called 'delegate-inspectors' (*contrôleurs-délégués*) of the European Development Fund, 'delegates of the European Commission' from 1975 onwards and, in 2009 'EU Heads of Delegation'. Thanks to the creation of the Association Européenne de Coopération (AEC), Ferrandi was able to hire officials whom he trusted, as they shared the same methods of dealing with African elites and owed him their jobs. Such a 'supple system' however, meant a great deal of opacity and arbitrary decision-making in the management of the c*ontrôleurs*' career, a situation that attracted much criticism after the arrival of British officials in 1973. Moreover, as the tasks of these *contrôleurs* became increasingly political and more complex over the years, their contractual status became increasingly untenable. As this chapter demonstrates, conflicts of interests between EEC institutions and the delegates led to the same rationalization of procedures as within DG8. From the 1970s onwards, the delegates pursued aims to be considered as real diplomats, to become civil servants and to benefit from more transparent recruitment and rotation procedures. These demands were typical of a move towards the 'professionalization' of the service. However, the delegates had to fight a long battle before their demands were met (1976–1986) and before they could engage in the construction of what came to constitute the European External Action Service. Indeed, they encountered a lot of opposition from DG8, which feared for its own autonomy, identity and legitimacy.

In this chapter, I analyse in depth the role of these delegates of the European Commission. Officially this role was purely technical: they were supposed to help the African administrations devise their projects and manage their implementation. However, as they had to negotiate the necessary compromises between the expectations of the Commission, those of the African Heads of State and the EEC Member States, to say nothing of the other interests involved (European consultancy firms and businesses), their task proved to be a highly political one. Indeed, nothing could be done by the African administrations (money spent, calls for tenders launched, contracts concluded) without their visas, and in the last resort, the visa of Ferrandi. At the same time, Ferrandi and his *contrôleurs* could do nothing without the agreement of their African partners, who were solely responsible for proposing and implementing the projects. This involved permanent dialogue and a delicate collaboration. The power of the delegates was ideally one 'of influence' – a bit like the idyllic colonial official of the colonial school. In the 1960s-70s many were former French, Belgian or British colonial officials.

With years, their role grew in complexity as they became responsible for preparing, along with African administrations, the programs, and later on the evaluations. The Commission financial reforms in the 2000s and the deconcentration process of the EDF management represented an important step towards bureaucratization. Like other New Public Management reforms, these reforms were justified in terms of increased autonomy, 'empowerment' and responsibility for local actors, but in practice they reduced the autonomy of what used to be little 'kingdoms' of their own and resulted in a 'bureaucratic frenzy' of reports.

At the end of the chapter, I consider the side-effects of this bureaucratization process: on the one hand, the delegations have to struggle between a never-ending flow of reports, audits, evaluations and criteria (linked to political conditionality) meant to render the EDF management transparent. On the other hand, they still have to compromise and dialogue with African administrations whose neo-patrimonial structure still prevailed in most cases and who try to avoid any transparency in aid management.